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COURTS AND CULTURAL DISTINCTIVENESS
Marie R. Deveney*
The claim that minority ethnic and religious groups are
culturally distinct from the dominant society is often, either
implicitly or explicitly, a key element of demands these
groups make to courts and legislatures for accommodation of
their needs. In such cases the decision maker's understand-
ing of what constitutes "cultural distinctiveness" is crucial,
for it can strongly influence the outcome of the accommoda-
tion question. In this brief Essay related to Peter Welsh's'
and Joseph Carens's 2 papers and Dean Suagee's remarks
delivered at the Preservation of Minority Cultures Sympo-
sium, 3 I contrast these panelists' subtle and sophisticated
understandings of cultural distinctiveness with the much
more simplistic and less encompassing understanding
commonly displayed by courts. I then suggest a few reasons
why courts may be reluctant to adopt the broader conception
represented by the panelists.
I. TYPICAL CLAIMS FOR
ACCOMMODATION OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
To set the context for the subsequent discussion of concep-
tions of cultural distinctiveness, let me begin with a few
illustrations of the kinds of claims that groups possessing
distinctive cultural traits frequently make to judges and
legislators when seeking protection against unintended
threats to their cultural survival or integrity.
Political communities can unintentionally jeopardize the
integrity or survival of culturally distinctive groups in a
myriad of ways simply by codifying dominant cultural values
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, currently on
leave and practicing with Dykema Gossett, Ann Arbor, MI.
1. Peter H. Welsh, Repatriation and Cultural Preservation: Potent Objects, Potent
Pasts, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 837 (1992).
2. Joseph H. Carens, Democracy and Respect for Difference: The Case of Fiji, 25
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 547 (1992).
3. Dean Suagee, Lecture at University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Symposium, Preservation of Minority Cultures (Feb. 15, 1992) (audiotape on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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and by implementing their own dominant cultural values.
They do so, for example, (1) by imposing on minority cultural
groups political and social institutions that are incompatible
with minority values and customs, (2) by enforcing against
minority groups laws of general applicability which offend
minority cultural norms, and (3) by disregarding minority
cultural needs when allocating or developing publicly owned
property.
In such instances, minority groups have responded with the
following three types of claims. First, the minority group
claims that it is entitled to its own political and social
institutions, and is entitled to govern its members and other
persons within its territorial boundaries. Indigenous peoples
frequently assert this entitlement, and, with some important
limitations, it has been granted in the United States to
Native American tribes residing on Indian reservations. 4 The
second claim is that members of a minority culture must be
released from laws of general applicability when compliance
with those laws poses a threat to their cultures. A familiar
example is the Amish's claim in Wisconsin v. Yoder5 that they
should be exempt from laws requiring school attendance after
the eighth grade.' The third claim is that significant, and in
some circumstances controlling, weight must be given to
minority cultural needs in allocating and developing public
property. An example of this claim is the demand of Native
Americans that public lands which have spiritual importance
to practitioners of tribal religions be managed in ways that
will not destroy that importance.7
II. THE COMMON JUDICIAL UNDERSTANDING OF
CULTURAL DISTINCTIVENESS
Judicial opinions which consider claims for accommodation
of the special cultural needs of minority groups reveal that
courts' decisions are often strongly influenced by judges'
understanding of what it means for a group to be culturally
4. For a comprehensive overview of United States law concerning the sovereignty
of Native American tribes, see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982).
5. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
6. Id. at 234 (accepting the Amish's claim).
7. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (rejecting this claim).
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distinct from the dominant society. 8 Not surprisingly, the
conceptions of cultural distinctiveness manifested by judicial
opinions are not uniform. A common, seemingly predomi-
nant, notion of cultural distinctiveness is discernible,
however. Reduced to capsule form, that conception is this:
Cultural distinctiveness which might warrant accommodation
exists only where members of the dominant culture find
easily perceived manifestations of the minority culture both
to be starkly different from their own and to be essentially
unchanged from a time which the dominant culture associ-
ates with the "authentic" minority culture.9 Four examples
of the operation of this common judicial conception follow.
This understanding of cultural distinctiveness led to
protective treatment in Wisconsin v. Yoder. Crucial to Chief
Justice Burger's opinion for the Court were his perceptions
of Amish culture as both static and radically different from
the dominant society in material and other easily perceived
ways. Burger emphasized that the Court was dealing with
a three hundred year old culture which, at least to the
untrained eye of most outsiders, ° had not "altered in
fundamentals for centuries."" The Amish remained distinct
from the dominant culture by virtue of their separation from
secular society, their agricultural occupations, their lan-
guage, and their material culture, including their archaic
dress and their rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios,
and televisions." Thus, the Court used the sharp and readily
grasped differences between the Amish and dominant
cultures and their adherence to an "authentically" Amish,
traditional way of life to justify accommodation.
8. Cultural distinctiveness standing by itself is not, of course, a basis upon which
an American court can order accommodation. The claimant minority group must rely
upon a judicially enforceable constitutional, statutory, treaty, or other legal right.
Almost all of the United States cases raising the cultural distinctiveness issue involve
the constitutional right to free exercise of religion or the statutory, treaty, or inherent
rights of Native American tribes. See, eg., cases cited in this Essay.
9. This conception appears to be dominant, but not universal. One noteworthy
example of sophisticated and sensitive judicial understanding of cultural distinctiveness
is the district court's opinion in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M.
1975), rev'd, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
10. For discussions of change in Amish culture, see JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH
SOCIETY (3d ed. 1980); DONALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE (1989).
11. 406 U.S. at 217.
12. Id. at 216-17.
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More recently, this common judicial understanding of
cultural distinctiveness supported an un-Solomonic splitting
of the baby in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation.3 The issue in that case was whether
the tribal government had zoning authority over lands which
were located on the reservation but owned by non-Indians.
In the controlling plurality opinion, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the tribal government possessed zoning powers
over lands which were, in his view, authentically Indian in
character, and consequently suitable for what he thought of
as authentically Indian activities. Those lands were "'pristine
[and] wilderness-like'" 4 "'place[s] where tribal members may
camp, hunt, fish, and gather roots and berries.'"'5 At the
same time, Justice Stevens concluded that the tribal govern-
ment had no right to control the development of lands owned
by non-Indians where those lands had lost "the character of
a unique tribal asset"-where they were used in modern and
thus presumptively un-Indian ways, such as for residential
and commercial development." Observation of the change in
appearance and use of these lands from "traditional" times
was the beginning and end of Justice Stevens's inquiry into
whether the tribal government had any culturally based
interest in controlling the development of these lands.
Finally, the commonly held judicial conception of cultural
distinctiveness has persisted from the nineteenth century to
contemporary times and has caused some courts to deny
accommodation to Native American peoples who have
selectively adopted some of the elements of the dominant
culture - particularly material, occupational, and recreational
elements. Two examples, separated by the passage of 140
years but united by this conception, follow.
In 1835, in United States v. Cisna,7 Justice McLean held
that changes in the material culture, occupation, and
property system of the Wyandotts had destroyed their
13. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
14. Id. at 445 (quoting the trial court's findings at 617 F. Supp. 750, 752 (E.D.
Wash. 1985)).
15. Id. at 441 (quoting the Amended Zoning Regulations of the Yakima Indian
Nation, Res. 1-98-72, §23 (1972)).
16. Id. at 447.
17. 25 F. Cas. 422 (C.C.D. Ohio 1835) (No. 14,795).
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"Indian" status.'8 In support of this conclusion, he cited the
following facts: the Wyandotts had interacted daily with the
surrounding white population and operated stores and
taverns on the reservation which were frequented by whites.
Justice McLean also noted that:
The Wyandotts have made rapid advances in the arts of
civilization. Many of them are very intelligent; their
farms are well improved, and they generally live in good
houses. They own property of every kind, and enjoy the
comforts of life in as high a degree as many of their
white neighbors. 9
Ergo, Justice McLean concluded, the Wyandotts were no
longer truly Indian and thus no longer were entitled to
distinctive treatment. 20 Almost a century and a half later,
notwithstanding the subsequent birth and flourishing of
anthropology during the interval, a Canadian court came to
the same conclusion, on the same grounds, about the Cree
Indians.
In La Socidt6 de Dgveloppement de La Baie James c.
Kanatewat,2' Cree Indians sued to prevent the James Bay
Development Corporation from building a mammoth hydro-
electric project.22 The Cree argued that the construction of
roads and airports and the diversion and damming of rivers
which were required by the project would destroy their
distinctive culture by making it very difficult or impossible
to continue the subsistence hunting and fishing activities
that were central to their identity as Cree Indians.'
In support of their argument, the Cree presented the
following evidence: the hunting, trapping, and fishing life
had great cultural and emotional importance to them; the
bulk of their diet consisted of subsistence foods such as
caribou, moose, rabbit, geese, sturgeon, and trout; they far
18. More specifically, Justice McLean held that such cultural change effectively
terminated federal authority under the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802 (cited as Act
of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139) over crimes committed by non-Indians on the
Wyandott Reservation. Id. at 424-25.
19. Id. at 424.
20. Id.
21. La SociWtM de Ddveloppement de La Baie James c. Kanatewat, R.J.Q. 166 (Que.
C.A. 1975).
22. Id. at 171.
23. See BOYCE RICHARDSON, STRANGERS DEVOUR THE LAND 20-25 (1991).
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preferred these foods to so-called "white" foods; and they
adhered to many traditional beliefs and practices regarding
the proper treatment of game.'
The Development Corporation disputed the existence of a
distinctive Cree culture, principally on the ground that
because Cree material culture had changed since contact
with the dominant culture, Cree culture was now simply a
rural Canadian one. How could the Cree be genuinely
Indian, the Corporation argued, when some of them ate
Kentucky Fried Chicken?'
The Quebec Court of Appeals accepted the Corporation's
argument that the Cree were no longer "Cree." Justice
Turgeon's opinion illustrates the judicial fixation on material
culture, stark contrast with the dominant culture, and
"authenticity." Thus, his opinion is worth quoting at length:
At each settlement, snowmobiles have replaced the dogs
of yesteryear. Modern houses provide shelter instead of
tents and igloos. These houses are generally heated with
oil and often with electricity. The Indians buy refrigera-
tors, radios, and in certain places, they have telephones.
The autochthones eat like the residents of urban
centers and their food is transported by boat or plane.
They eat delicacies of all kinds, fresh fruits, packaged
foods, frozen fresh meat, canned meat, eggs, bread, cake,
and milk products like butter, milk and a little cheese.
The clothing of the past has disappeared, and the
Indians and Inuits of northern Quebec wear the same
clothes as whites which they purchase in stores.
In their houses, there are beds, furniture, utensils and
dishes.
They go to the movies regularly, two or three times a
week, they have recordplayers, guitars, transistors. They
have pool halls at their disposal along with other amuse-
ment facilities. In the summer they devote themselves
to ball games and other sports and in winter youths play
hockey, ice-skate, and ride their snowmobiles. At Hud-
son's Bay, they have a fiber-glass canoe factory. It also
should be noted that for transportation on lakes and
rivers, they use canoes with gas motors, not paddles.
24. Id. at 34, 42-43, 88, 223-24, 245-46.
25. Id. at 244.
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The autochthones buy a lot at the Hudson's Bay stores
and also by mail from Eaton and Simpson. They do a lot
of sport fishing and own modern fishing gear like whites
do.
In sum, the Indians and Inuits have abandoned the
way of life of their ancestors and have adopted that of
the whites.26
Blinded by changes in the Cree's material culture and in
some of their recreational and occupational activities, the
Quebec Court of Appeals could not perceive the persistence
of a distinctive cultural identity-an identity constituted in
important part by subsistence hunting and fishing.
III. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF
CULTURAL DISTINCTIVENESS
In sharp opposition to the understanding of cultural
distinctiveness that typifies much judicial thinking are the
understandings offered by Peter Welsh,27 Joseph Carens,'
and Dean Suagee.29 All three emphasize that culture is
dynamic rather than static and consists of spiritual, social,
and political elements in addition to material and other
visible manifestations. Welsh and Suagee stress that
cultural insiders often perceive meaningful distinctiveness
and cultural persistence where outsiders see only assimila-
tion, and that cultural insiders often assign a different
hierarchy of values to elements of their cultures than do
outsiders.3 °
Peter Welsh exposes "cultural authenticity" as the
"inauthentic" construct of the majority. Because it identifies
authenticity with the majority's romantic notion of "traditional"
26. Kanatewat, R.J.Q. at 171 (author's translation).
27. Welsh, supra note 1; Peter H. Welsh, Lecture at University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform Symposium, Preservation of Minority Cultures (Feb. 15, 1992)
(audiotape on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
28. Carens, supra note 2; Joseph H. Carens, Lecture at University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform Symposium, Preservation of Minority Cultures (Feb. 15, 1992)
(audiotape on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
29. Dean Suagee, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples at the Dawn of the
Solar Age, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 671 (1992); Suagee, supra note 3.
30. Welsh, supra note 1, at 843-44; Suagee, supra note 3.
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minority culture, the concept of cultural authenticity is
unsatisfying even when applied to artifacts. When used to
evaluate living cultures, Welsh explains, that concept is
treacherous. As Welsh aptly warns, the "contexts in which people
live today are seen as inauthentic" and the ability of minority
cultures to exercise self-determination is undermined. 3' This
concept of cultural authenticity, as Welsh suggests, reveals far
more about the majority culture than about the minority one-it
reveals the majority's nostalgic yearnings for mythical times and
its reflexive veneration of "old things."32
Joseph Carens points out a critical element of cultural
distinctiveness which courts generally overlook-a distinctively
constituted identity-and explores the link between that
identity and claims for cultural protection. In his discussion of
potential justifications for continued Fijian control of land,
Carens notes that many Fijians no longer want to live in
traditional ways, and observes that as Fijians come to want the
same things that other members of society want, the case for
distinctive treatment weakens. However, because Fijians' deep
attachment to the land persists, Carens correctly indicates that
the fact that most Fijians no longer use the land in traditional
ways should not terminate the inquiry into whether Fijians
might have a valid, culturally based entitlement to exclusive
Fijian ownership.' So long as ownership of the land remains
constitutive of Fijian identity, Carens argues, there is some
culturally based justification for maintaining exclusive Fijian
ownership. As Carens suggests, when evaluating a claim for
protection of some aspect of minority culture, the connection
between that aspect and the existence of a distinctively
constituted group identity should be explored.
Dean Suagee's remarks also focus our attention on Native
American claims that they are the appropriate arbiters of
what constitutes "authentic" Indian culture and that modern
Native American cultures that selectively merge elements of
tribal pasts and the multi-cultural present are "authentic"
Indian cultures. Suagee also reminds us of the significance,
both in moral terms and in terms of assessing cultural
distinctiveness-of Indian peoples' self-image as being
culturally distinct from the non-Indian majority.34
31. Welsh, supra note 1, at 843-44.
32. Id. at 842.
33. Carens, supra note 2, at 603-06.
34. Suagee, supra note 3.
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IV. THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN JUDICIAL CONCEPTIONS
OF CULTURAL DISTINCTIVENESS
To recapitulate, the common judicial conception is that
cultural distinctiveness which might warrant accommodation
exists only where members of the dominant culture find
easily perceived, usually material, manifestations of the
minority culture both to be starkly different from their own
and to be essentially unchanged from the culture at a time
which the dominant culture associates as being "authentic."
Considering this conception of cultural distinctiveness in
light of the panelists' understandings reveals many of the
serious errors inherent in this conception.
First, culture is reduced to its material and other easily
perceived manifestations-such as occupations, foods,
clothing, and tools. It is denied its spiritual, social, psycho-
logical, and identity components. Second, and correspondingly,
the distinctiveness of a minority culture is judged by comparing
only its material and other easily recognized manifestations to
those of the dominant culture. Similarities between those
aspects of the two cultures is considered proof of lost distinc-
tiveness; important and persistent differences in values,
identity construction, religious beliefs, social structures, and
the like are given inadequate attention. Third, the judgment
whether a culture is distinctive is based entirely on the
perceptions of outsiders. The perceptions of their own
distinctiveness possessed by members of the minority group
are not taken into account. Fourth, "authentic" minority
culture is what the majority understands to be the culture of
the minority group at some fixed point in the past-usually
a mythological, romantic past constructed by the majority.
The minority group's understanding of what constitutes their
"authentic" culture is not consulted. Finally, the majority
views "authentic" culture as static, rather than dynamic.
Consequently, contemporary minority cultures rarely will be
deemed authentic.
Why has judicial thinking generally failed to transcend
this simplistic conception of cultural distinctiveness? I doubt
that any comprehensive answer could be given to this
question; in any event, I have none to offer. I would like to
suggest three partial explanations, however.
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The sophisticated and inclusive understanding of cultural
distinctiveness typified by Welsh, Carens, and Suagee is
relatively new, even among anthropologists. It has not
replaced, in the popular mind, the conception commonly
employed by courts. Tenacious popular beliefs about culture
may have prevented some judges from fully comprehending the
sophisticated evidence of and arguments about cultural
distinctiveness that have been presented in certain individual
cases.
Another partial answer may be this: inherent in the concepts
of dynamic culture and "authentic" contemporary minority
cultures is the likelihood that the claims that minorities may
make for cultural protection will change and increase over time.
Thus, claims for cultural protection are not fully predictable,
even by the minority group, at any given point.35 Many judges
legitimately may be troubled by the lack of predictability that
would attend adoption of the principle that, because they are
equally authentic, new cultural practices are equally deserving
of protection as ancient ones. Within constitutional constraints,
legislatures may apply this principle selectively-they may
choose rather arbitrarily which practices to protect. Courts,
however, may not apply this principle selectively. If courts
adopt it, they must either apply it across the board or articulate
some principled basis for refusing to do so. Judges may feel
that courts are institutionally incapable of dealing adequately
with the unpredictability problem. Judicial failure to recognize
the dynamic nature of authentic culture effectively leaves
protection of contemporary culture to legislatures.
Finally, concern about self-serving claims that are not
externally verified may make judges resistant to arguments
that they should accept the minority group's assessment of
the distinctiveness and authenticity of the cultural practice
for which protection is claimed. External verification in the
form of anthropologists' expert testimony could be, and
usually is, provided in cultural protection cases. But it must
be recognized that in making such expert testimony central,
35. For example, in United States v. Means, Lakota Indians demanded special
access to and control over a site in the Black Hills National Forest. 627 F. Supp. 247
(D.S.D. 1985), rev'd, 858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988). Although the Black Hills as a whole
are considered traditionally sacred by the Lakota, the site at issue in Means held no
particular significance in traditional times. Rather, its special religious significance
had just recently been discovered by Lakota elders. 627 F. Supp. at 253.
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outsiders again are given the power to decide whether a culture
is distinctive, and whether the practice to be protected is
authentic.
CONCLUSION
Thus, even as the kind of sophisticated understanding
represented by Welsh, Carens, and Suagee becomes common-
place, courts may resist adopting it fully because of judicial
manageability concerns. Moreover, courts may continue to
rely heavily on the expert opinions of outsiders to provide
external verification of minority groups' claims about the
nature of their cultures and identities. The challenge for
minority groups, and for the anthropologists and advocates
of cultural preservation and self-determination who support
them, will be to suggest both judicially workable solutions to
the unpredictability problem and ways to make minority
groups' own assessments of distinctiveness and authenticity
central, while still satisfying the need for some external
verification.

